Locked-Cicero - On Duties

From The Inferno

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Cicero’s On Duty (De Officiis), Book I

Contents 1 Author's Notes/Introduction 2 Author and Context 3 Summary 4 Themes

Author's Notes/Introduction

Cicero’s philosophy sucks. Compared to someone like Plato, Aristotle, or even Sextus Empiricus, he’s clueless and awkward. Read De Officiis for the political philosophy, not for the dumb ways he flops around the definition of Duty and Honour like a fat blubbery seal.

Author and Context

Marcus Tullius Cicero, a very well-known Roman poet/writer, wrote De Officiis. Cicero’s writings are influenced heavily by Roman virtue, and his background: he grew up in a rustic area of Rome and, while he had the benefit of citizenship from birth, the fact that he had not been born in a more cultured area stayed with him always. On Duty is thus a book on Roman duty as a political insider (he served as a proconsul), a regional outsider, but, above all, a Roman citizen.

Summary

De Officiis’ structure takes the form of a letter from Cicero to his son, also named Marcus. He had been sent away (as were many rich or politically well-situated boys) to Athens, as a pupil in Cratippus’ school. Cicero opens the epistle with an explanation to his son that it is “beneficial to combine things Latin with things Greek,” and therefore urges him to temper his new knowledge of Greek customs and traditions with the virtues of Rome: specifically, the Roman duty to State.

• Cicero acknowledges that he is not the best at philosophy, but tells his son that, having “devoted the best part of my life to oratory,” he can at least instruct him on that.
• Begins: It seems that the most immediately applicable study in philosophy is that of duties; for the concept of Duty governs every social interaction.
  • From the beginning, Cicero assumes that honour is contingent upon the development of Duty, and dishonour lies with its neglect.
• Says that the definition of Duty/Virtue is highly contested; however, certain things about the limits and boundaries of the definition may be stated:
  • For example, a man who defines Good with no connection to Virtue “cannot cultivate either friendship or justice or liberality” (1.5)
  • Likewise, no brave man can judge that pain is evil, or a man or restraint who says pleasure is to be sought after above all
• To Cicero, no consistent advice on duty can be taught except by those who believe honourableness above all is to be sought (1.6).
• Cicero begins to define what duty is:
  • Man is different from animals in that we may “perceive consequences, comprehend the causes of things… by seeing with ease the whole course of life, [we] prepare whatever is necessary for living it.” (I.11)
  • Man also seeks after truth and its exposition (1.13)
  • Finally, man is bound by “the power of nature and reason” (1.14)
  • Therefore, “the honourableness that we seek is created from and accomplished by these things. Even if it is not accorded acclaim, it is still honourable, and, as we truly claim, even if no one praises it, it is by nature worthy of praise” (1.14)
  • The honourable is fourfold:
    • 1) the perception of truth and ingenuity
    • 2) the preservation of human fellowship and agreements
    • 3) the lofty and unconquered spirit
    • 4) Order, limit, moderation, and restraint.
• Cicero sees that “these four are bound together and interwoven,” but it is still possible to find particular duties rooted in each individual type of honour.
  • For example, philosophical seeking is always solely in the first category (1.16)
  • The other three virtues aim at necessities for human life (1.17)
• Warns against the injustices that lie within the perversion of philosophical Duty:
  • First, one “should not take things that have not been ascertained for things that have, and rashly assent to them”
  • Second, he sees it as contrary to one’s greater duty to allow yourself to be “drawn by a devotion away from practical achievements: all the praise that belongs to virtue lies in action
  • This is very Roman of him: a pragmatic approach to everything, even philosophy.
• The next most important category of duty is “the most wide-reaching one… the reasoning by which the fellowship of men” is held together (1.20).
  • There are two components of this duty: “justice, the most illustrious of the virtues… and the beneficence connected with it,” which may be called kindness
  • Justice (1) “is that no man should harm another unless he has been provoked by injustice”
    • Interesting: Cicero allows for a cycle of retributive justice to flourish in his city.
  • (2) one should treat common goods as common and private ones as one’s own
    • By seeking that which is not one’s own, one is “violating the law of human fellowship,” and striking at the root of justice.
  • As we are not “born alone,” but into a community, we owe ourselves to our friends and our country.
  • The injustices inherent in such fellowships are that (1) “men may inflict injury” on each other, or (2) men may fail to act when they could have, to avert a bad situation.
    • These may be brought about by fear (1.24), riches and wealth (1.25), or the lust for a position of command or honour (1.26)
    • This brings up an interesting point: he has said that honour is an internal thing. How can there be such a thing as “a position of honour”?
• Having decided now what injustice is, we can “judge with ease what is our duty on each occasion” (1.29) that fulfills justice:
  • First of all, doing so is tricky, for sometimes that which seems proper to do is, in fact, not so, and vice versa. (1.31) That is, sometimes one will have to set aside the law or break an agreement to do what is right.
  • One type of injustice is trickery and legalism; abiding by the letter, and not the spirit, of the law. (1.33)
  • It is honourable to fulfill one’s duty to someone who has wronged you: just because they lie does not mean that you are allowed to do likewise.
• One should follow the rules of war as laid out in the Roman constitution (1.36), for it is both fair as well as conforming to Roman religion.
• Blah blah blah. Cicero goes off on a huge expletive tangent that is really expletivey to follow. He’s annoying. Basically: even when wronged in war, do that which is honourable, and always fulfill your promises to everyone, even enemies.
• This is justice; now, to talk about kindness.
  • While it is essential for human nature, there are many caveats; one must exercise kindness carefully lest one gets hurt.
  • To do someone harm while acting kind occurs often, and such people are not to be viewed as honourable, but as “dangerous flatterers.”
• Kindness may be bestowed on “those who… have in them mere images of virtue,” as “we do not live with men who are perfect and [truly] wise.” (1.46)
  • Again: it is impossible to find (or to ascertain) men who are truly virtuous.
• “the most important function of duty… is to enrich above all the person who is most in need of riches” (1.49)
  • Idea of an egalitarian society in which those who are granted more help those who are given less; lends itself, again, to national cohesiveness and nondiscrimination
• Examination of the fellowships by which man sees one another:
  • The universal brotherhood of man
  • Race, family, and language
  • City
    • Notable: Cicero places being from the same city above being from the same tribe/family or race. Would he have done so had he been born in Rome itself? Seems an antiquated notion.
  • Familial relations
  • Marriage and nuclear family
  • But “none is more important… than when good men of similar conduct are bound by familiarity.”
    • “honourableness… moves us, even if we see it in someone else”
  • Greater than any human relationship, however, is that of a citizen to the republic.
• Cicero has thus set forth the four ways by which something might be honourable and dutiful. However, he urges the reader to keep in mind that “that which is done with a great and lofty spirit… appears in the most brilliant light.”
• Unfortunately, such things “all too easily give birth to willfulness and an excessive desire for preeminence.” (1.64)
  • The more famous a man gets, the more preeminent he becomes, and the more conscious of this he is.
• A brave spirit lies in both the disdain for external things and glories, plus the performance of deeds that are great and beneficial to others
  • Glory and splendour lie in the latter, but the true nature of duty lies in the first. This is like where Aristotle glories the life of contemplation over the life of practical virtue.
• “But those who are equipped by nature to administer affairs must… engage in public life.”
  • Just as in the Republic, those who are most reticent to lead the state are also best equipped for it, and must sacrifice their private lives for the good of the state; this is given additional weight by the Roman emphasis on serving the State. They must “acquire the magnificent disdain for human affairs that I stress”
• Denies that military affairs carry more weight than civic
  • Decries the idea of seeking war for one’s personal glory; sees war as a tool of the state, not as a way to win individual honours.
• Sees duty exemplified by, “Let arms yield to the toga, and laurels to laudation.” Weapons of war are less glorious than the business of state (1.78)
• “The honourableness that we seek depends entirely upon the concern and reflection of the spirit.” (1.79)
  • To anticipate how a situation is going to turn out requires both a reflective spirit and a keen mind, and both are glorious in the performance of duty.
• Preserving individual honour at the cost of the state’s well-being is a common mistake (1.84); “there are those who do not dare to say what they think… through fear of unpopularity”
• Says that “the struggle for positions of honour” is an “altogether wretched practice,” for it makes something petty that should not be; it degrades the office (1.87)
• FINALLY, the last element of honourableness: modesty and restraint (1.93)
  • That which is modest and comely is honourable, and vice versa.
    • However, this raises a seeming contradiction: didn’t this same man say that one can never judge honour on an external appearance?
  • Every virtue is seemly, and appears noble to those who understand virtue
  • Two senses: seemliness “of a general kind,” and also “an individual element of what is honourable”
  • Thus, we must respect all men equally; with justice, so we might not harm others, and with humility to not outrage them
• The duty derived from this “leads to agreeing with and preserving nature.”
  • Aristotelian ideal, again.
  • Nature must be filtered through reason, however (1.101), else “rashness and carelessness” will lead a man away from philosophy.
• “To return to our delineation of duty:… all impulses should be controlled and calmed…” and the duty of mankind is not idleness, but rather “earnestness, for greater and weightier pursuits.”
• Rejects bodily pleasure as inferior to the “superiority of man,” because animals can also receive it (similar to Aristotle’s Function Argument).
• “If anything at all is seemly, [it is] an evenness both of one’s whole life and of one’s individual actions” (1.111)
  • Moderation and virtue are synonymous
• Cicero then goes on to discuss various roles that one may play in life, and how each is to be undertaken as passionately and thoroughly as possible. Generally, one’s course in life is dictated by nature, social status, chance, and upbringing.
  • Continues to emphasize moderation in physical, social, and mental bearing; by fulfilling honourableness in them, one fulfills his social duty.
  • Gives advice to his son on the power of speech and oratory
• Closes with the ambiguity of honour: men often cannot tell honourable and dishonourable apart, or find that which has more honour of two choices.

Themes

• “honourableness… moves us, even if we see it in someone else”
  • The example of a single honourable man may impress such behaviours on those who honour him.
• The greatest relationship is that of a citizen to the republic
  • Again, the reader sees the ubiquitous veneration of the Roman state: in religion, philosophy, and political science, the motherland takes precedence over all else. It is precisely this national identity that Polybius believed allowed Rome to flourish.
• Honour and duty drawn from both nature as well as the constructs of man
  • It is just and honourable to act in accordance with nature, but one must take care to not act on impulse, as social order must be preserved.
• Social leaders must be unwilling to be leaders
  • Parallels the Platonic idea of a guardian-philosopher drawn from the Republic II (or III?): the leader who loves contemplation more than power, but sacrifices his own life of contemplation for the well-being of his state.
  • In this case, however, the reader sees a more concrete reason for the philosopher to give up his contemplation, that was somewhat lacking in Plato: his love of the state drives him.
• Many themes drawn from Aristotle: the political nature of man, the function of man as philosophical, the supremacy of the contemplative life.