Plato - Euthyphro
From The Inferno
Plato's Euthyphro
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[edit] Author and Context
The ideas of this dialogue are attributed to Socrates, while the actual writing is Plato’s. As this is one of his earlier dialogues, we receive a fairly clear picture of Socratic dialogue and the character of the historical figure Socrates, unlike later Platonic writings such as the Republic, where the figure of Socrates is seen as simply a mouthpiece for Plato’s own views.
[edit] Plot Summaries
Socrates, on his way to dispute the charges of impiety that Meletus and two other Athenian citizens have brought against him, runs into Euthyphro in the agora (central marketplace) of Athens, outside the court. Euthyphro, a devout young man, professes to have a full, undogmatic, and clear knowledge of religion and piety. This is evidenced by him suing his own father for murder: he believes that his ability to justify such actions is a proof of his devoutness – “Euthyphro would not be superior to the majority of men if I did not have accurate knowledge of all such [religious] things” (though such behaviour seems to be sophistic in nature, and may be a case of what Socrates is charged for – “making the worse argument look the strongest”). Having listened to his boasts, Socrates asks Euthyphro if he “should become your pupil,” that Euthyphro might lend his knowledge of religion to Socrates. The argumentation then proceeds as such:
Socrates: “Tell me then, what is the pious, and what the impious, do you say?”
Euthyphro: The pious is to do what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrong.
Socrates: But, this is not the pious action. You are giving me something pious, not piety itself. I wish to know “that form itself that makes all pious actions pious”
-That is:
1) That which all pious things have in common
2) That which all impious things lack
3) That which makes all pious things pure (Source: John Hare’s notes)”
Euthyphro: ”what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious.”
Socrates: But some gods love war, and others love peace. What is just to one god may be unjust to another. Therefore, the same things are god-hated and god-loved. By your definition, such things would be both pious and impious.
Euthyphro: Very well, the pious is then that upon which all gods agree to love, and the impious that which all gods agree to despise.
Socrates: “Consider this: Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?”
-That is:
1) An object that can be described as being carried is so described because it is being carried; it is not being carried because it is in its nature to be-carried.
2) Any object that is described as being-something is so because something is happening to it; that which is happening to it is not a result of it being intrinsically something. In perhaps clearer terms: an action on an object predicates the description of that object in terms of that action. The description of an object in terms of an action does not predicate the action.
3) That which is loved falls into the category of (2).
4) That is, a loved thing is so because it is being loved; it is not loved because it is a loved thing.
5) A pious thing is a loved-thing because it is pious, not pious because it is a loved-thing.
6) A god-loved-thing is a being-loved-by-the-gods-thing; it is not being loved by the gods because it is a god-loved-thing (as in (2))
7) Therefore, a god-loved-thing is not a pious thing, as a god-loved-thing is god- loved because it is being loved by the gods, while a pious thing is loved because it is pious, not vice versa.
The Argument of Substitutability:
1) Even if (7) is false, and the pious is the god-loved, they should be substitutable for one another
2) The pious is loved because it is pious
3) The god-loved is loved because it is god-loved
4) Thus, the pious is pious because it is loved.
5) However, while (1) and (3) are true, after substitution, they appear false
(Question: is this really true? Can substitution be used like this, or does it just seem to be so?)
Therefore, (7) is true.
Euthyphro: Fine; let me be more specific and practical in my approach to the definition, then. The godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with man’s duty to the gods, distinct from man’s duty to his fellow man. By knowing the proper ways to (a) sacrifice and (b) pray, man knows the proper things to (a) give the gods and (b) ask from the gods.
Socrates: Do the gods, then, rely on man for their sustenance in some way? It seems that this definition of piety would have it be a service to them that we perform in exchange for services that they perform for us. Are you saying that the gods are unable to exist without man’s services?
Euthyphro: Why, no; they do not require that which we provide them, but it pleases them to receive that which we give them.
Socrates: So, then, you are saying that piety is giving the gods what they desire, and your arguments have come full circle.
At this point, Euthyphro quits the dialogue in disgust, saying “I am in a hurry now, and it is time for me to go.” In this way, he shows himself both an inferior philosopher (unwilling to pursue truth above other concerns) and (it can be interpreted) an immature man, inventing excuses to escape Socrates’ seeking questions. Socrates leaves us with hope, for he says that “You were on the point of doing so, but you turned away,” with regards to a true definition of piety. Unfortunately, Euthyphro’s hasty retreat leaves the reader feeling unsatisfied and despairing of further progress on the topic.
[edit] Symbolism
This is philosophy. If you wish, Socrates is a symbol for pederastic influences on Greek culture, as Meletus would have it widely believed. If you don’t wish, there are no symbols.
[edit] Themes
Adherence to religion, no matter how thoroughly examined, will likely require one to make certain jumps in logic that can only be attributed to faith, and are logically inexplicable. Even though the conventional definition of piety in the Greek religion failed to hold up to coldly logical scrutiny, this does not mean that it is impossible to follow; however, it suggests that one’s faith cannot be entirely based on logic, but must, of necessity, have certain leaps of faith.
The irony of Socratic dialogue is keenly brought out in the very beginning and towards the end of the dialogue. While Socrates is superficially polite and careful to praise Euthyphro and denigrate himself, this praise takes on a mocking tone towards the end, when he continues to praise Euthyphro even given his philosophical equivocation and stumblings.
[edit] Notes and further points to make
As a dialogue, Euthyphro presents more of a methodological sketch than a particularly impressive philosophical point. The question, “What is piety,” is left unanswered by the end of the dialogue, and the reader gets a sense that this aporia (a sense of bewildering wonder at the intricacies of the universe and philosophy) was a common end of Socratic dialogue. Unfortunately, Socrates’ suggestion that “it seemed to me that a definition was not far off” leaves the reader questioning whether the aporia arises from a truly difficult conundrum or is simply a result of Euthyphro’s frustration and inability to think outside his dogmatic principles.
The strongest philosophical point presented in this dialogue is probably the question of “Is the good God-loved, or that which is God-loved good?” a question that religious scholars still debate. The fact that this question cannot be answered without much intricate thought (and even so, it may still be a paradox) is important.
[edit] Further readings
The lecture notes on this dialogue were particularly successful in succinctly outlining the argumentation. For crib notes, I would refer to this.
