Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism
From The Inferno
Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism
Contents |
[edit] Author’s Notes/Introduction
[I’m sorry for the blockyness of this study guide, but Sextus is difficult to outline because he’s not really constructing a proof so much as he is explaining what he thinks. I hope it’s clear enough. ]
[edit] Part One
Sextus belongs to the school of thought known as Skepticism, which holds that the goal of mankind is to achieve mental tranquility and that the way to achieve this goal is through what Sextus refers to as the suspension of judgment. “We merely report accurately on each thing as our impressions of it are at the moment,” Sextus writes (31). At the core of Skepticism is the ability to present an argument that can contradict any other argument presented: the Skeptic, when presented with A, must be able to reply with not-A. Furthermore, the Skeptic must hold as equally valid both A and not-A; neither of them can be denied or affirm, and though this the Skeptic will achieve the desired mental tranquility. Skeptics, however, does assent to those feelings which derive from “sense-impressions.” That is, if I am standing outside getting hypothermia and shivering, I will not seek to deny that I am cold. The “dogma” to which Skeptics are skeptical is that which concerns “non-evident” things (36). The Skeptic will, in giving such regard to appearances, “by virtue of the tradition of laws” accept piety as good, but will not preference any tradition over another (40). This is part of what it is to be an “urbane” Skeptic (see lecture notes); the Skeptic will withhold judgment but will still function in society. And because the Skeptic will not withhold judgment regarding whether they are catching hypothermia, the Skeptic will seek only moderation with regard to unavoidable things.
One possible challenge to the Skeptics position is that, in saying that one must withhold judgment, they are, in fact, espousing a dogma. Sextus’ reply to this is that the Skeptic in saying such a thing is not “making positive statements about the reality of things outside himself,” but is rather merely reporting his own feelings (37). The Skeptic therefore has no dogma but instead follows a system of reasoning which a way in which to live.
There are ten modes of judgment by which suspension of judgment may be brought about: from variation in animals, from differences in human beings, from differences in construction of organs of sense, from the circumstances, from the positions and places involved, from the admixtures present, from the compoundings of the underlying objects, from the relativity of things, from the frequency of occurance from the institutions (44). It is beyond the scope of this study guide to detail what exactly all of these mean, but basically all these modes stem from an understanding that things are relative and subjective; nothing, the Skeptic says, except sense-experience is entirely objective and so as a result judgment must be suspended. On page 72 Sextus presents an alternate five modes (based on disagreement, based on the argument which would regress to infinity, that based on relativity, that based on assumption, and that based on circle arguments). Sextus argues that based on these modes it is possible to reply to every question.
Sextus then presents various ways in which to refute other schools of thought (77). Read those through if you want an idea of how Skeptical thought can be applied.
He also dissects the various phrasings used by Skeptic thinkers (beg. 79). The phrase “no more” he says means “Why one thing more than another?” (79). This he says shows how a state of equilibrium is reached because the Skeptic acknowledges the equal validity of the objects opposed. One interesting point he makes about these formulae is that they are used “indifferently” and not “absolutely,” meaning that the Skeptics do not assert absolutely that the formulae mean what the Skeptics say they do; this hints perhaps at Sextus’ uncertainty regarding whether in espousing his philosophy he is himself being a dogmatist. Page 83 he explains how “determining nothing” is not dogmatist but rather reflective of the state of mind in which the Skeptic is in; he is declaring his impression of the things discussed and not doing so dogmatically. The phrase that follows of “All things are undetermined” Sextus alleges that “are” means “appear to the philosopher” (83). This idea of relativity – that the philosopher says only things as they appear to him and does not seek to promote an objective truth regarding external objects – is central to this philosophy (86).
[edit] Part Two
Regarding signs, Sextus says that self-evident objects need no sign because they come to our knowledge of themselves. Non-evident objects cannot have a sign because they are not comprehensible to men. Temporarily non-evident objects can however use both recollective signs and indicative signs; recollective signs are things associated with the object which recall that object to our imagination, whereas indicative signs signifies the object by virtue of its nature (as smoke does for fire, for example). About indicative signs however Sextus says that there are arguments equally valid both for its existence and against its existence.
Sextus now discusses a few forms of arguments used by other philosophers. Syllogisms, he says, fall into circular reasoning because oftentimes the universal proposition at the beginning of the syllogism is the result of observing the individual cases; going from universal to specific is therefore a tautology, as the universal was derived from the specific in the first place.
Induction too Sextus frowns upon as an impossible task because of the necessarily “shaky foundation” of any inductive argument (105). Definitions Sextus says are not entirely necessary because you cannot define an object which you cannot perceive, and clearly if you can perceive something before you define it, then definitions are not necessary for apprehending things.
Generally speaking, Sextus in this part advocated for a simple, straight-forward life uncluttered by philosophical nonsense which obscures, rather than facilitates, perception of the world. “It is sufficient…to pass one’s life empirically and undogmatically in accordance with the commonly accepted observances and preconceptions, suspending judgment about statements grounded on dogmatic subtlety and furthest removed from the business of life,” he writes (110).
[edit] Part Three
Sextus now addresses metaphysical concerns, showing how crazy reason can get when divorced from simple observations of experience. He first addresses cause, saying that there are both arguments for (even if nothing actually exists, there must be a reason why we think things do exist) and against (to see a cause you need to see an effect, and this leads to the same circular reasoning of a syllogism) causes existing. Also, cause leads to an ad infinitum argument, because there is always the cause of a cause. He gives a few more statements on either side leading to suspension of judgment.
He then discusses physical change and whether or not one can say it does or does not happen. One argument he gives is that if something changes, it must change in time, but it cannot change in the past or the future, and neither can it change in the present (the present time being also unreal), nothing can change. In refuting physical change, Sextus also refutes becoming and perishing (118).
He then addresses rest, and whether absolute rest can occur. The problem with rest he says is that anything at rest is acted upon, and anything acted upon is motion, so then all things are in motion. Place too is problematic, for although sense-experience says it exists, those who make the argument that it exists from their observation of the parts are deduce place’s existence by means of itself. Sextus says, however, that because the arguments counter the sense-experience, he will suspend judgment on this matter. The same problem of arguments contradicting sense-experience happens with time (124).
Sextus concludes by commenting briefly on why Skeptics sometimes put forth weak arguments. They do so, he says, because the Skeptic puts forth an argument only as strong as the thing which he is trying to counter, just as a doctor will give weak remedies to make weak ailments.
